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Abstract
One of the ways in which attackers try to steal sen-
sitive information from corporations is by sending
spearphishing emails. This type of emails typically
appear to be sent by one of the victim’s cowork-
ers, but have instead been crafted by an attacker.
A particularly insidious type of spearphishing emails
are the ones that do not only claim to come from
a trusted party, but were actually sent from that
party’s legitimate email account that was compro-
mised in the first place. In this paper, we pro-
pose a radical change of focus in the techniques used
for detecting such malicious emails: instead of look-
ing for particular features that are indicative of at-
tack emails, we look for possible indicators of im-
personation of the legitimate owners. We present
IdentityMailer, a system that validates the au-
thorship of emails by learning the typical email-
sending behavior of users over time, and compar-
ing any subsequent email sent from their accounts
against this model. Our experiments on real world e-
mail datasets demonstrate that our system can effec-
tively block advanced email attacks sent from genuine
email accounts, which traditional protection systems
are unable to detect. Moreover, we show that it is re-
silient to an attacker willing to evade the system. To
the best of our knowledge, IdentityMailer is the
first system able to identify spearphishing emails that
are sent from within an organization, by a skilled at-
tacker having access to a compromised email account.
1 Introduction
Companies and organizations are constantly under
attack by cybercriminals trying to infiltrate corpo-
rate networks with the ultimate goal of stealing sen-
sitive information from the company. Such an attack
is often started by sending a spearphishing email. At-
tackers can breach into a company’s network in many
ways, for example by leveraging advanced malware
schemes [21]. After entering the network, attackers
will perform additional activities aimed at gaining
access to more computers in the network, until they
are able to reach the sensitive information that they
are looking for. This process is called lateral move-
ment. Attackers typically infiltrate a corporate net-
work, gain access to internal machines within a com-
pany and acquire sensitive information by sending
spearphishing emails. In a spearphishing attack an
email is crafted and sent to a specific person within a
company, with the goal of infecting her machine with
an unknown piece of malware, luring her to hand out
access credentials, or to provide sensitive informa-
tion. Recent research showed that spearphishing is
a real threat, and that companies are constantly tar-
geted by this type of attack [38].
Spearphishing is not spam. While they may share
a few common characteristics, it is important to note
that spearphishing is still very different from tra-
ditional email spam. In most cases, spearphishing
emails appear to be coming from accounts within the
same company or from a trusted party, to avoid rais-
ing suspicion by the victim [40]. This can be done in
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a trivial way, by forging the From: field in the attack
email. However, in more sophisticated attacks, the
malicious emails are actually sent from a legitimate
employee’s email account whose machine has been
compromised, or whose credentials have been previ-
ously stolen by the attacker [30]. From the attacker’s
perspective, this modus operandi presents two key
advantages. First, it leverages a user’s social connec-
tions: previous research showed that users are more
likely to fall for scams if the malicious message is
sent by somebody they trust [14]. Secondly, it cir-
cumvents existing detection systems, which are typ-
ically based on anti-spam techniques. This happens
for two reasons: first, the content of spearphishing
emails looks in many cases completely legitimate and
it does not contain any words that are indicative of
spam, since the goal is to make it resemble typical
business emails. Second, if an email impersonating
one of the company’s employees comes from that per-
son’s computer, which has been compromised, then
origin-based detection techniques, such as IP reputa-
tion, become useless. Secondly, it circumvents all IP
and origin-based blacklisting systems, as well as email
sender or domain verification systems such as Sender
Policy Framework (SPF) and DomainKeys Identified
Mail (DKIM) [19, 43], since the email is sent from a
genuine email account.
A new paradigm for fighting targeted at-
tack emails. Given how different spearphishing
emails are compared to traditional spam and phish-
ing emails, we propose a paradigm shift in detection
approaches to fight this threat, and present Identi-
tyMailer, a system to detect and block spearphish-
ing emails sent from compromised accounts. In-
stead of looking for signs of maliciousness in emails
(such as words that are indicative of illicit content,
phishy-looking content, or suspicious origin), Iden-
tityMailer determines whether an email was ac-
tually written by the author that it claims to come
from. In other words, we try to automatically val-
idate the genuineness of the email authorship. Our
approach is based on a simple, yet effective observa-
tion: most users develop habits when sending emails.
These habits include frequent interactions with spe-
cific people, sending emails at specific hours of the
day, and using certain greetings, closing statements,
and modal words in their emails. The core of Identi-
tyMailer consists in building a user profile reflect-
ing her email-sending behavior. When a user’s ac-
count gets compromised, the attack emails that are
sent from this account are likely to show differences
from the behavioral profile of the genuine user.
Behavioral anomalies can be very evident or more
subtle. An example of a “noisy” attack is a worm
that sends an email to the entire address book of
a user [39], which is a behavior that typical users
do not show. In more realistic scenarios, attackers
might try to mimic the typical behavior of the person
they are impersonating in their emails. What they
could do is sending emails only at hours in which the
user is typically sending them, and only to people she
frequently interacts with, or even imitate the user’s
writing style.
To make it more difficult for attackers to success-
fully evade our system, IdentityMailer builds the
email-sending behavioral profile for a particular user
by leveraging both the emails previously sent by that
specific user and a set of emails that other users in
the organization authored. In a nutshell, Identi-
tyMailer compares the emails written by the user
to the ones written by everybody else and extracts
those characteristics that are the most representative
of the user’s behavior. If common characteristics are
shared by multiple users, however, these will be de-
emphasized because they are not specific to a particu-
lar user. For example, certain functional words only
used by a given user (and rarely by others) would
model her behavior well.
When an attacker tries to learn a victim’s sending
behavior to mimic it in his attack emails, he only has
access to that user’s emails (since he compromised her
account or personal machine). It is unlikely, however,
that he has access to the ones authored by all other
users within the company – besides the few emails
exchanged by the victim and the coworkers he/she
is interacting with. Therefore, all the attacker can
do is learning the most common habits of the user
(such as the email address that is more frequently
contacted, and at what time the user generally sends
emails), but he has no guarantee that those traits are
actually representative of the victim’s behavior.
Working on the sending end. Traditional anti-
spam systems work on the receiving end of the email
process. This means that they analyze incoming
emails, and establish whether they are legitimate or
malicious. This approach is very effective in gen-
eral, but it has many drawbacks in our specific case.
First of all, the analysis that can be performed on
incoming emails has to be lightweight, due to the
large amount of emails, mostly malicious, that mail
servers receive [36]. As a second drawback, learn-
ing the typical behavior of a user on the receiving
end has the problem that a mail server only has
visibility of the emails that are exchanged between
that user and people whose mailboxes are hosted on
the server. Therefore, a behavioral profile built from
these emails might not be representative enough to
correctly model the sending habits of users.
Because of the aforementioned problems, we pro-
pose to perform the analysis when emails are sent, be-
fore they are forwarded to the outgoing SMTP server.
Our approach builds a behavioral profile based on
the emails that a user sent in the past (and a set of
emails authored by the other people in the organi-
zation). Then, every time an email is sent by that
account, our approach checks if this email matches
the profile learned for the real account’s owner. If
the email does not match the learned profile, we con-
sider it anomalous. The account might have been
compromised, and the email might actually be an at-
tack attempt. However, the anomaly might also be
a false positive. Perhaps the user is working on a
deadline, and is sending emails late at night, or is
sending a personal email, and using a colloquial lan-
guage, while the account is primarily used to send
work-related emails.
False positives are a big problem in traditional
anti-spam systems, because they annoy users in the
best case, and they prevent them from receiving im-
portant emails in the worst case. Luckily, the fact
that our approach operates on the sending side of
the email process comes to our aid. Any time an
email is flagged as anomalous, we can start a process
to verify the identity of a user. In our design, this
process would include sending a confirmation code to
a device owned by the user, as part of a two-factor
authentication scheme [4]. If the user correctly in-
puts the confirmation code when asked we consider
the anomaly as a false positive, and the email is for-
warded. In addition, we update the user’s behavioral
profile to include this particular email, so that we
will we avoid similar false positives in the future. If
the user fails at solving the challenge, however, we
consider the email as a possible attack, and we dis-
card it. We acknowledge that having to go through
an identity-verification process can be annoying for
users. However, we think that having users confirm
their identity once in a while is a fair price to pay to
protect a company against advanced email attacks, as
long as the verifications are rare enough (for example,
one in every 30 emails on average).
We tested IdentityMailer on a large set of
publicly-available emails, and on real world data sets
made of malicious targeted emails sent to the cus-
tomers of a large security company.
In summary, this paper makes the following con-
tributions:
• We propose a new approach to detect
spearphishing emails sent from compromised
accounts: instead of looking for signs of mali-
ciousness, we introduce a set of features that
are representative of the email-sending behavior
of a user, and propose a method to check emails
against the learned sending behavior (i.e., email
authorship validation).
• We implemented the approach in a system called
IdentityMailer, which was tested against a
large dataset of publicly-available emails, as well
as other real-world datasets of targeted attack
emails. Our experimental results show that
our approach can effectively block spearphish-
ing emails that state-of-the-art systems failed to
detect with a detection rate above 90% for users
with a sent history of only 1,000 emails. In con-
trast, existing systems that look for signs of ma-
liciousness are failing to detect most of these ad-
vanced email attacks.
• We show that having access to the emails sent by
the victim is not sufficient to evade Identity-
Mailer, and that imitating the most common
characteristics present in those emails can even
augment the chances of being detected by the
system.
2 Threat Model
Spearphishing can be broadly defined as targeted
phishing. In traditional phishing emails, attackers
pretend to be operators from online services such as
Online Social Networks or Online Banking Portals,
and lure their victim into inserting their credentials
on a fake web page that reproduces the home page of
that online service. An example of phishing email is
shown in Figure 1. A spearphishing email is a type of
phishing email for which the attacker collected some
information about the victim, and included it in the
attack email to make it more believable [24].
A spearphishing attack can be more or less sophis-
ticated. An example of an attack with a low sophisti-
cation is a password reset request for a corporate ser-
vice sent to all the employees of a company. In this
case, the only difference with a traditional phishing
email is that, unlike phishing attempts against com-
mon online services, all people receiving the malicious
email supposedly have an account on the corporate
service. A more sophisticated spearphishing attack
is one that targets a specific person within a com-
pany, and leverages personal information about that
person in order to make the email look even more
convincing. Attacks of such sophistication can usu-
ally be detected by variations of traditional anti-spam
and anti-phishing techniques. For instance, the at-
tack email might be coming from an IP address that
does not belong to the online service that it is al-
legedly coming from; similarly, the URL of the link
in the phishing email might not hosted on the do-
main of the online service. Systems that look at the
source IP address of an email [1, 26, 27] or at the ac-
tual phishing web page [9,46] are able, in general, to
detect such attacks.
Although existing anti-spam and anti-phishing
techniques can be adapted to detect certain types
of spearphishing attacks, as the attacker gets even
more sophisticated, these techniques become inade-
quate in fighting this threat. Consider, for example,
the spearphishing email in Figure 2. In this case, the
Received : from [FOREIGN IP ]
From : <support@s i te . com>
To : <victim@company . com>
Dear user ,
Your account has been hacked .
P lease r e s e t your password
<a h r e f=”http :// f a k e s i t e . org”>
here </a>
Figure 1: Example of a traditional phishing email.
The source IP address does not belong to the online
service that the email claims to come from, and the
URL points to a phony web site.
attacker managed to compromise the email account
of one of the company’s managers, and is using it to
send an email to a member of his team. In the attack
email, the attacker asks the victim to send his boss
a copy of the latest report. The victim is very likely
to fall for this attack because there is nothing indica-
tive of a malicious email: the email is coming from
the email account of the manager, and therefore the
IP address is the correct one; similarly, the language
of the email is not suspicious at all, because the lan-
guage used is typical of regular business emails. In
addition, since the attacker has access to the man-
ager’s email account, he can retrieve the report di-
rectly from there, once the victim sends it, and does
not need to include the link to an external web server
in the spearphishing email. From the perspective of
traditional anti-spam and anti-phishing techniques,
the email in Figure 2 looks perfectly authentic, and
has no indicators for being flagged as anomalous.
In this paper, we propose a technique that can de-
tect sophisticated spearphishing emails that do not
present any signs of maliciousness. As we said, our
approach works as follows: first, we learn the typical
behavior of a user based on his sent email history;
then, we compare each new email sent from that user
account to determine if it does match the learned
behavior. In the following sections, we describe our
approach in more detail.
Received : from [COMPANY IP ]
From : <manager@company . com>
To : <victim@company . com>
Dear <vict im >,
As d i s c u s s ed during our meeting ,
p l e a s e send me the l a t e s t r epo r t .
The template to use i s attached .
Thanks ,
<manager>
Figure 2: Example of advanced spearphishing email.
The sender account has been compromised, therefore
the sender IP address is not anomalous. Also, the
content of the email does not look anomalous: the
language used looks like regular business emails.
3 Behavioral Profiles
In the very first stage, IdentityMailer must accu-
rately learn and model the email-sending behavior of
a user, as it will enable us to perform better detection
of anomalous emails in a later stage. However, defin-
ing user-specific traits that best distinguish a user’s
sending behavior is not trivial. To determine these
traits, IdentityMailer requires two datasets: a set
Mu of emails written by a user U and a set Mo of
legitimate emails written by other people. By com-
paring the emails in Mu to the ones in Mo, we can
extract the distinguishing characteristics of the email-
sending behavior of U .
Mo should be composed of both emails sent by
people working in the same organization as U , as
well as of emails written by people who are com-
pletely unrelated to U . As we will explain later,
the privacy concerns of our approach are minimal,
because we do not save the full email, but only a
feature vector associated to it. On one side, having
Mo built from the emails sent by the users work-
ing in the same organization as U helps in giving
less importance to common characteristics shared by
coworkers. For example, if no user in the organiza-
tion ever sends emails on Sundays, it is less peculiar
if the user follows this trend. On the other hand,
having emails sent by users who are completely unre-
lated to U in Mo helps giving to the model examples
of behavioral characteristics that are uncommon in
the organization, but common outside of it. We pro-
vide a more detailed description on how we build Mo
in Section 3.2. By using only legitimate emails to
build our behavioral profiles, IdentityMailer does
not need to have ever observed any attack email to
perform detection, similarly to what happens with
traditional anomaly-detection systems. This is im-
portant, because it makes our approach independent
from specific attack schemes.
To build the email-sending behavioral profile for a
user, we proceed in two steps. First, we extract a
number of features for each email in Mu and Mo.
As a second step, we leverage these feature vectors
to build a classification model, which represents the
actual behavioral profile. We use this profile to an-
alyze any email written by the user, and determine
whether it was really written by that user.
3.1 Extracting Behavioral
Email Features
We define three classes of email features, which per-
tain to: writing habits, composition habits, and in-
teraction habits. Previous research showed that au-
thorship identification is possible by looking at sty-
lometry features (which are a subset of what we call
writing habits) [6]. However, these approaches rely
on texts of a certain length (250 words or more) [10].
Unfortunately, as we show in Section 5, many emails
are short. If our approach relied only on the writing
habits of a user (i.e., stylometry features), it would
fail at detecting short attack emails. Therefore, we
need additional information to deal with such emails,
as described here after. In the following, we describe
the features that our approach uses to characterize
an email.
Writing habits. People normally develop their own
writing style. For example, some people use certain
functional words (such as “although”) more often
than others, or write dates in a certain way. Analyz-
ing a user’s style has been used in the past to deter-
mine authorship of texts and emails [2, 6, 23]. Simi-
larly, we consider a user’s writing style as a strong
indicator of email authorship. An attacker could,
in principle, learn the characteristics of his victim’s
style, and replicate them in the attack emails that he
sends. However, previous research showed that imi-
tation of another person’s writing style is detectable
most of the time [3]. In addition, as we will show in
Section 5.4, it is difficult for an attacker to figure out
which features are the most representative of a user’s
writing style. In the following, we define a number
of features that help defining a user’s writing style.
The complete list of writing-habit features used by
IdentityMailer can be found in Table 1.
1) Character occurrence (62 features). These features
represent how often a character, or a set of characters,
appear in the email text. Given a set of characters
C and an email text M , we define the character oc-
currence of C in M oc as the number of times that
any of the characters in C occur in M , divided by
the length of M . Examples of character occurrence
features include the frequency of alphabetical letters
(such as “a”), the frequency of certain punctuation
signs (such as “;”), and the frequency of sets of char-
acters (such as capital letters or cardinal numbers).
2) Functional word occurrence (344 features). These
features represent how often the person uses specific
functional words. We define as functional words those
words that do not serve to express content, but in-
stead are used to express grammatical relationships
with other words within a sentence. These include
adverbs (such as “when”), auxiliary verbs (such as
“is”), and prepositions (such as “for”). Some of these
features are useful to determine whether a user uses
certain functional words in their extended or short-
ened form, and to what extent (for example, whether
she usually uses “don’t” instead of “do not”). Given
a word FW and a set of words Wm in an email,
we calculate the word occurrence ofw in Wm as the
number of times FW occurs in the email, divided by
the size of Wm.
3) Special word occurrence (11 features). These fea-
tures represent how often a user uses certain “spe-
cial” words in her emails. Special words include full
names, dates, and acronyms. Given a regular expres-
sion Rsw representing the special word, an email M ,
and a set Wm containing the words in M , we cal-
culate the special word occurrence osw of Rsw as the
number of matches in M for Rsw, divided by the size
of Wm.
4) Generic style characteristics (38 features). These
features represent generic characteristics of the style
of a user. Examples include the type of bullets that
the user uses in lists (“1-”, “1.”, or others), whether
she uses a comma as a separator for large digits or
not, and whether she uses a space after punctuation.
Given a set of regular expressions Rsc representing
a style characteristic, an email M , and a set Wm
containing the words in M , we define the style char-
acteristic sc as the number of matches of the regular
expressions in Rsc in the email M , divided by the
size of Wm.
5) Style metrics (33 features). These features capture
information about the style of entire emails. Some
features are rather simple, such as the number of
paragraphs in the email. Others are more advanced,
and depict the expressiveness of the language used in
the email. Examples are the Sichel measure or the
Yule metric, which describe how complex the vocab-
ulary used by an author is. These metrics have been
already used in previous work on authorship identifi-
cation [41,44].
6) Context-specific words (variable number of fea-
tures). These features look for occurrences of words
that are common in a certain industry. People work-
ing in that industry will use them more or less fre-
quently, depending on their role in the company and
their specific job. Examples of context-specific words
for a financial institution include the words “stock”,
“asset”, and “contract.” Given a word W and a set
of words Wm in an email, we calculate the context-
specific word occurrence owcs as the number of oc-
currences of W in Wm, divided by the size of Wm.
Context-specific words vary with the type of busi-
ness that the company is doing, and have been used
in other authorship-recognition research [47]. We dis-
cuss the choice of context-specific words that we used
in our experiments in Section 5.2.
Composition and sending habits. Other habits
that users develop regarding their email-sending be-
havior pertain to the way of composing emails. In the
following, we describe this type of features. A com-
plete list of composition-habit features can be found
Character occurrence
Punctuation . : ; , ’ ” ? !
Special characters % & $ @ * \ ¿ ¡ # / -
Parenthesis () [] {}
Ordinals 0123456789
Capital letters ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQURSTVWXYZ
Functional words
a aboard about above absent according to across after
against ahead to all along alongside amid amidst although
am among amongst and another any anybody anyone
anything are aren’t arent are not around aint ain’t
around as to as far as as well as as aside from ’re aslant
astride ah at athwart atop because because of been
before behind believe below beneath besides beside best
between be beyond both but by means of by can not
cannot can’t can cant can you close to concerning considering
cause cos could despite did not didn’t didnt did
do does do not don’t dont down due to during
each other each either enough even if even though even everybody
everyone everything every except for except far from few following
for from had not hadn’t hadnt had have ahead to
he herself hers her himself him his I believe
hi hello happy take care regards please greetings cheers
I’d if I’ll in accordance with in addition to in case in case of including
in front of in lieu of in order that in order to in place of inside of inside in spite of
instead of instead in to into in is it I
latter less like little look lots many may
me mid might not mightn’t mightnt might mine minus
more most much must not mustn’t must not mustnt must
myself my near to near need neither next to next
nobody none no one nope nor nothing notwithstanding no
now that off of okay OK on account of on behalf of once
one another one on to on top of onto on opposite or
others other ourselves our out from out of outside of outside
out over owing to own past per please plenty
plus prior to pursuant to quite regarding regardless of round same
seem several shall not shall shan’t shant she should not
shouldn’t shouldnt since somebody someone something somewhere some
soon so subsequent to such take care thanks thank you than
that the theirs their themselves them then these
they think this those though throughout through till
towards toward to under unless unlike until upon
up used us versus via was not wasn’t wasnt
was we were not weren’t werent were what whatever
when whereas where whether or not whether which whichever while
who whoever whomever whom whose will will not with
within without won’t wont worth would yes yet
you yourself yourselves yours your
Special word occurrence
Full name date day of the week shortened day
month shortened month year phone number
dollar amount time of the day fraction
Generic style characteristics
Emoticons :) :-) :P :-P :( :-( :/ :-/
Bullets type 1 1) 2) 3) ...
Bullets type 2 1- 2- 3- ...
Bullets type 3 1. 2. 3. ...
Bullets type 4 (i) (ii) (iii) ...
Bullets type 5 first second third ...
Bullets type 6 – ...
Programming language keywords if then else while do switch case return
comma separated list oxford comma signature no space after punctuation
no comma in large digits comma in large digits
Style metrics
number of paragraphs sentences per paragraph unique words number of words message length
number of long lines number of short lines frequency of words of length N (from 1 to 20)
hapax legomena hapax dislegomena Sichel’s S measure Honore’s R measure
Yule’s metric Simpson’s metric
Context-specific words
account accounting attach attached attachment authorize authorizing bank
candidate cash capacity consideration contract detail derivative document
email e-mail Enron equity fax financial flow gas
increase information item manage market oil option potential
recommend reserve review risk scan section send sent
stock supply target trader trading trip
Table 1: List of writing-habit features used by IdentityMailer.
Message characteristics: has signature has URL
indented lines quoted lines
original attached has attachment
is reply is forwarded
has HTML n. of recipients
n. of ccd users
Time characteristics: hour of the day (24 features)
day of the week (7 features)
URL characteristics: points to domain (variable # of features)
Table 2: List of composition-habit features used in our approach.
in Table 2.
1) Message characteristics (11 features). These fea-
tures capture specific user habits in email composi-
tion. Examples of such habits are including the orig-
inal email at the end of a reply, including quotes
to the original email interleaved with the text, or
adding a signature at the end of the email. Message-
characteristic features are boolean, meaning that
they are set to 1 if a certain behavior is present in
an email, and to 0 otherwise.
2) Time characteristics (31 features). Users tend to
send emails at specific times of the day, and only dur-
ing specific days. For example, most people working
in an office will send emails between 9 am and 5 pm,
from Monday to Friday. Given this observation, an
email sent at midnight on a Saturday might be sus-
picious. These features keep information about when
an email has been sent. In particular, they look at the
day of the week and at the hour at which the email
was composed. Similarly to other composition-habit
features, time-characteristic features are boolean. We
define seven features for the days of the week, and 24
features for the hours of the day.
3) URL characteristics (variable number of features).
Some users include URLs in their emails, such as links
to web pages that are needed for their job, or to web-
sites that they consider interesting. Over time, the
set of URL domains that a user includes in her emails
tends to be limited [8]. On the other hand, if the user
sent an email with a URL pointing to a domain that
she has never included before, this might be consid-
ered as suspicious.
To instantiate URL-characteristic features, we
need a set of domains Lu that the user, as well as
other people in her organization, referenced in the
past. This helps identifying resources that are “inter-
nal” to the organization (which should be referenced
often in the company’s emails). We also include an
“other” category to take into account those domains
that were never referenced by anybody in the organi-
zation. Similarly to the other composition-habit fea-
tures, URL-characteristic features are boolean, and
are set to 1 if that domain is referenced in the email,
and 0 otherwise.
Interaction habits. The last type of features in-
volves the social network of a user. Users typically
send a large deal of emails to a handful of contacts,
usually coworkers or close friends. Having an email
sent to an address that was never contacted before
might thus contribute to the suspiciousness degree of
an email, especially if the user under scrutiny does
not usually interact with many other users.
To characterize the social network of a user, we
look at the recipients email addresses (the To: field),
as well as at carbon copy addresses (the CC: field).
We define four types of interaction-habit features,
representing the email addresses and domains that
a user sends emails to. The recipient address list fea-
tures take into account the email addresses that an
email is addressed to, while the recipient domain list
ones look for the domains that those email addresses
belong to. The idea behind this distinction is that
if a user sends an email to an address that she has
never referenced before, but that belongs to an or-
ganization that she often interacts with, this is less
suspicious than an email addressed to a completely
unknown domain. Similarly, we define a carbon copy
address list and a carbon copy domain list by analyz-
ing the email addresses of the CC: field.
To instantiate the interaction-habit features, we
need a list La of email addresses that the user, as
well as the other people in the same organization,
contacted in the past. It is important to look at the
email addresses that the user has never contacted,
but some of her coworkers have. This is because hav-
ing a user sending an email to an executive she has
never contacted before is very suspicious, and might
be a sign of spearphishing. In addition, to account
for those addresses and domains with which nobody
in the organization has interacted before, we add, for
each of the four feature types, an “other” category.
Similarly, we leverage a list Ld of domains to which
the users in the organization have written emails in
the past.
Interaction-habit features are boolean: they are set
to 1 if an email is addressed to the address (or do-
main) represented by a given feature, and to 0 other-
wise. If, for any of the four feature types, all features
of that type have a value of 0, the “other” feature is
set to 1.
3.2 Building Users
Behavioral Profiles
After extracting a feature vector for each email that
a user sent, we leverage them to build a behavioral
model that is able to distinguish whether an email
has likely been sent by that user or not. To learn the
distinguishing characteristics of the email-sending be-
havior for a user U , IdentityMailer compares the
feature vectors built from the emails sent by the user
(Mu) to the feature vectors built from a set of legit-
imate emails sent by other people (Mo). The chal-
lenge in picking Mo is to select a set of emails that is
representative enough to make the most characteris-
tic features of the behavior of the user stand out.
Given a user U who wrote a set of emails Mu,
we pick the set of emails Mo as follows. For each
user Ui in the organization (other than U), we keep
a set of emails that Ui has sent in the past. We call
this set Mui. In addition, we consider a “special”
user Ux. The set of emails Mux corresponding to
the user Ux consists of emails that were not written
by the users in the organization. This set of emails
could be a subset of the emails that were received
by the company’s mail server, or a set of publicly-
available legitimate emails. Then, for each email in
Mu, we pick a random email written by another user
Ui and add it to Mo. We change the user Ui for each
email in Mu, in a round-robin fashion. By doing this,
we ensure that the distribution of emails written by
different users in Mo is uniform.
After having collected Mu and Mo, Identity-
Mailer’s classifier is trained to learn the email-
sending behavioral profile of user U . To this end, we
leverage Support Vector Machines (SVMs) trained
with Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) [25].
The SMO algorithm is an iterative algorithm used
to efficiently solve the optimization problem required
for training SVMs. More details are provided in Sec-
tion 5.2.
Since the email-sending behavior of a user is likely
to slightly change over time (for example, as the user
makes new social connections), IdentityMailer
keeps updating the behavioral profile, by adding
to the profile the new emails that the user sends.
The identity verification mechanism described in Sec-
tion 4.1 ensures that the emails we add to the behav-
ioral profile have been genuinely written by the user.
Being able to constantly update a user’s behavioral
profile is important because it gets more accurate as
the number of emails sent by the user increases. How-
ever, the strength of the model also depends on how
consistent a user is in her email-sending habits. As
we will discuss in Section 5.2, the features that we
defined all contribute in defining the email-sending
behavior of a user. The weight of the different fea-
tures actually depends on each user’s specific habits,
and cannot be generalized. In addition, some features
are easier for an attacker to imitate than others. For
example, it is easy for an attacker to emulate the
functional words that are most used by a user. How-
ever, the more advanced style metrics, such as the
Sichel measure, are not as easy to emulate. In any
case, as we will show in Section 5.4, it is difficult for
an attacker to figure out which features he should
imitate to evade detection by our approach.
4 Detecting Anomalous Emails
After having built the email-sending behavioral pro-
file for a user, our approach checks any email that the
user is sending against his profile. More specifically,
our algorithm works as follows:
Step 1: For each email M that user U sends, we
extract a feature vector Vm.
Step 2: We compare Vm against the behavioral pro-
file of U , which we call BPu. If Vm complies with
BPu, we validate the email as being written by U ,
and proceed to step 4. Otherwise, we consider M as
anomalous, and go to step 3.
Step 3: To verify that the email was written by the
legitimate user U , we perform an identity verification.
If U correctly confirms her identity, M is considered
as a false positive, and we go to step 4. If U fails
to confirm her identity (or decides not to, because
she may recognize an ongoing attack), the email is
considered as malicious and is discarded. A notifica-
tion may then be sent to an administrator for further
investigation. In the next section, we describe how
we envision the identity verification process to take
place.
Step 4: We add Vm to the set of feature vectors
that are used to calculate BPu. This information
will be used the next time that the behavioral profile
is updated.
It is not necessary to update the behavioral profile
for a user for every sent email. The reason is that,
although the email-sending habits of a user change
over time, they do not change that fast. In addition,
updating the behavioral profile for a user may require
up to 30 seconds in the current implementation.For
these reasons, we envision the behavioral profile up-
date as a batch process that could be performed daily
or weekly.
4.1 Verifying a User’s Identity.
One of the main challenges that anti-spam systems
have to face are false positives. Flagging a legitimate
email as spam has a high impact on the user, be-
cause it might prevent her from seeing that email at
all. This is due to traditional anti-spam techniques
operating on the receiving side of the email process,
where it is impossible to verify that the sender of an
email is who she actually claims to be. In contrast,
operating on the sending side enables us to request
the user to prove her identity when a certain email is
looking suspicious, before emails are actually sent.
In our approach, we propose to perform an iden-
tity verification process by sending, for example, a
confirmation code to a device controlled by the user,
and request the user to input that code as part of
a two-factor authentication process [4]. This veri-
fication process might be a simple method such as
answering a security question or a more advanced
method, such as a text message sent to the user’s
mobile phone as part of a two-factor authentication
process [4]. Each method has advantages and dis-
advantages. However, analyzing the single identity-
verification methods that one could implement goes
beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, we
just assume that by going through this process the
user can prove her identity with high confidence.
We are aware that having to go through an iden-
tity verification process might be an annoyance for
users. However, there is always a trade-off that needs
to be established between usability and security. So,
we argue that if the number of validations that a
user has to go through is reasonably low, it is a fair
price to pay to significantly increase the security of
a company. In Section 5.2 we perform an analysis
by which we show that the number of identity ver-
ification processes required by IdentityMailer is
reasonably low, and probably acceptable for a user’s
perspective.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of Iden-
tityMailer. First, we describe the evaluation
datasets that we used in our experiments. Then,
we perform an analysis of the classifier used to build
the email-sending behavioral profiles. We show that
the behavioral profiles build by IdentityMailer are
effective at detecting attack emails sent by compro-
mised accounts. Also, we analyze the resilience of our
system to “mimicry” attacks and show how Identi-
tyMailer is able to deal with and detect this type
of advanced attacks.
5.1 Evaluation Datasets
To evaluate IdentityMailer we leverage a num-
ber of email datasets. First, we leverage the Enron
corpus [18] as a large dataset of legitimate emails.
This publicly-available dataset contains the emails
sent by the executives of a large company over several
years. The dataset comprises 148 users, accounting
for 126,075 emails. The Enron dataset is representa-
tive of the type of emails sent in a large corporation
(in terms of sending times, language, interactions),
and this makes it suitable for our testing purposes.
In the remainder of the paper, we call this dataset D1.
As a second dataset of legitimate emails we use a set
of emails that were provided to a large security com-
pany by their customers for research purposes. This
dataset is made of 1,776 emails which we consider as
useful to complement D1 because of their diversity.
In particular, they are useful to populate Mux, as we
explained in Section 3.2. We call this dataset D2. We
use the datasets D1 and D2 for training. In partic-
ular, for each user in D1, we build an email-sending
behavioral profile, by leveraging both the emails in
D1 and in D2.
For testing purposes, we needed a number of emails
sent from compromised accounts, and preferably used
as part of a targeted attack. The problem is that, un-
like regular spam, collecting a large amount of such
emails is challenging. To overcome this problem, we
manually selected three datasets of malicious emails.
These emails come from a set of malicious messages
detected by a large security company, which were
submitted by their customers for manual analysis and
validation.
The first dataset, that we call S1, is composed of
generic spam emails. Such emails typically advertise
goods or services, such as stock trading, pharmaceu-
ticals, and dating sites. The main difference between
the emails in S1 and common spam is that a state-
of-the-art system failed in detecting them as mali-
cious, and therefore we can consider them as “hard”
to detect; we test IdentityMailer on this dataset
to show that although the system has not been de-
signed to fight traditional spam, it performs well in
detecting it, in case it was sent by compromised email
accounts. S1 is composed of 43,274 emails.
The second dataset, that we call S2, is composed of
malicious emails (mostly phishing scams) that were
sent by email accounts that had been compromised.
We selected these emails by looking at emails in S1
that were malicious, but that had valid DKIM and/or
SPF records [19, 43]. In total, S2 contains 17,473
emails.
The third dataset, which we call S3, is a dataset
of more sophisticated spearphishing emails. Such
emails try to lure the user into handing out corporate-
specific sensitive information (such as access creden-
tials, confidential documents, etc) to a malicious
party, usually via social engineering. As we said,
spearphishing emails are particular insidious to com-
panies, because it can lead to high financial losses.
S3 contains 546 emails. These emails went unde-
tected by the defense systems deployed by the secu-
rity company, and were submitted by its customers
after the attacks had happened. The emails in S2
and S3 closely resemble the threat model that we
are trying to counter with IdentityMailer. In the
next sections, we leverage these datasets to evaluate
the effectiveness of IdentityMailer. First, we in-
vestigate how representative of a user’s behavior the
behavioral models built from D1 and D2 are. Then,
we leverage these behavioral models to see whether
IdentityMailer would have detected an anomaly,
in case any of the users sent a malicious email from
S1, S2, or S3. As a last experiment, we investigate
how easy would be to evade IdentityMailer by im-
itating a user’s email-sending behavior. We do this
by modifying the emails in S1, S2, and S3 to look
more and more similar to each user’s sending behav-
ior.
5.2 Analysis of the Classifier
We start by describing how we selected the features
used in IdentityMailer to build behavioral user
profiles. Then, we investigate how accurate these
profiles are to determine the true authorship of an
email. Finally, we show that the writing habits are
usually not sufficient to detect whether an email is
forged or not.
Instantiation of the features. As we explained
in Section 3.1, some of the features used by our ap-
proach are specific to the organization in which the
system is run. In particular, we need to know which
email addresses and domains have been contacted
previously by the users within an organization, as
well as the domains that have been referenced in the
body of the emails, as part of the URLs. We lever-
age the dataset D1 to calculate the sets Lu, La, and
Ld. For this particular dataset, Lu was composed of
595 domains, La of 22,849 email addresses, and Ld of
3,000 domains. Notice that, in a production environ-
ment, the size of Lu, La, and Ld would increase over
time, since the users in the company would post more
URLs, and contact new people. This means that
the number of features used by IdentityMailer in-
creases over time as well. We argue that this is not a
problem. Our experiments on S1, which we omit for
space reasons, show that the set of different domains
that a user contacts in her emails over time grows
slowly.
As for the writing-habit features, we needed to se-
lect a set of context-specific words. We did this man-
ually, by analyzing the most common words in the
emails of D1 and picking those words that are specific
of the business of the company (i.e., finance, oil, and
human resources). In total, we selected 46 context-
specific words, which are listed in Table 1. We ac-
knowledge that this process could be automated, but
the manual selection worked well for our purposes,
and previous author-identification work used a simi-
lar approach [47].
Accuracy of the classifier. To evaluate to what ex-
tent the IdentityMailer profiles are truly represen-
tative of the sending behavior of users, we proceeded
as follows. First, for each user U in D1, we extracted
the sets Mu and Mo for that user, following the al-
gorithm described in Section 3.2. As said before, we
use the emails sent by U as positive examples, and a
mix of emails from D1 and D2 as negative examples.
In this experiment, we consider IdentityMailer to
make a correct classification if it attributes an email
authored by a user U to that user, and an incorrect
classification otherwise.
After having trained the system for each user, we
performed a 10-fold cross validation on them to in-
vestigate the accuracy of the behavioral profiles. The
10-fold cross validation gives us an idea of how the
system would behave in the wild, while encounter-
ing previously-unseen emails. In particular, it gives
us an estimate of how many emails would be incor-
rectly flagged as malicious because of a change in
behavior by a given user, as well as how many at-
tack emails would actually be missed by Identity-
Mailer. In this experiment, a false positive would
indicate an email that was authored by the user,
but flagged by IdentityMailer as anomalous. In
this case, an identity verification process would be
started, by which the genuine user would have cor-
rectly confirmed her identity. We want the number of
false positives to be low, because having to confirm
one’s identity too often would become a users’ an-
noyance. Conversely, a false negative would indicate
a forged email missed by IdentityMailer, thus mis-
takenly attributed to the legitimate user. We want
false negatives to be as low as possible, since in a real
scenario, each of them would correspond to an attack
that went undetected.
Intuitively, there are two factors that influence the
robustness of a user’s behavioral profile. The first
factor is the number of emails that a user has sent
in the past. Having a larger number of examples of
a user’s sending style and habits makes the model
more representative and less prone to false positives
and false negatives. The second factor is how consis-
tent is the sending behavior of a user. A user always
sending emails in the morning, to a limited set of re-
cipients, will obviously be a lot more easily recogniz-
able than a user who uses her account for both pro-
fessional and personal use and quite frequently sends
emails at night.
The number of emails sent by users in D1 varies
substantially. On average, every user in D1 has sent
840 emails, with a standard deviation of 1,345. The
largest number of emails sent by a user in D1 is
8,926. The accuracy of IdentityMailer increases
significantly as the number of emails sent by a user
increases, because the system can learn the typical
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Figure 3: Analysis of false positives and false negatives on the ten-fold cross validation. The X-axis shows
the number of emails that a user has sent in the past. As it can be seen, both false positives and false
negatives decrease as the user’s sent email volume increases.
behavior of that user more accurately. It is chal-
lenging to show how the system behaves in a figure,
because any time the history of emails sent by the
user increases, we are evaluating a new system; for
this reason, a Receiving Operating Curve (ROC) is
not suited to represent the accuracy of Identity-
Mailer. In Figure 3 we represent the average rate
of false positives and false negatives according to the
sent email volume of a user. As Figure 3 shows, the
accuracy of the email-sending behavioral profile built
by IdentityMailer increases as the user sends more
emails. The error bars in the figure show that the ac-
curacy of a behavioral profile does not only depend
on the email volume, but also on the user’s style and
habits. For users who have consistent habits, Identi-
tyMailer can achieve almost zero false positives and
false negatives. On the other hand, certain users hav-
ing more variable habits end up having higher rates
of false positives and false negatives than the average.
However, this variability is reduced as the number of
emails sent by the user increases.
Figure 3a shows the average number of false pos-
itives generated during the 10-fold cross validation,
broken down by the amount of emails sent in the
past by each user. As explained before, a false pos-
itive in this context would result in the user being
required to go through an identity verification mech-
anism. We note that, on average, a user who has sent
at least 1,000 emails would have to confirm her iden-
tity for 1 in 12 emails. By increasing the sent email
volume, a user who sent at least 8,000 emails would
have to confirm her identity on average for 1 in 58
emails that she sends. Given the average number of
emails that a typical corporate user sends nowadays
— 33 per day, according to a recent report [37], reach-
ing this amount of interaction history would not take
a long time. Moreover, these are average numbers,
thus users with a more stable email-sending behavior
can already reach 2% false positives after having sent
only 1,000 emails. These users would then have to
go through the identity verification process for only
1 in every 50 emails that they send. We argue that
these numbers are reasonably low and quite accept-
able in a corporate environment, where the hassle of
confirming a user’s identity is largely compensated by
a significantly higher user protection against identity
and IP theft.
Similarly, Figure 3b shows the number of false neg-
atives for the 10-fold cross validation. As it can be
seen, a sent history of 1,000 emails enables Identi-
tyMailer to build a model able on average to block
90% of the forged emails. Recall improves as the
number of sent emails increases. The behavioral pro-
file of a user who sent at least 8,000 emails has an
average recall of 96%. A careful reader might no-
tice that the accuracy of IdentityMailer might be
slightly under current state-of-the-art anti-spam sys-
tems. However, as we previously said, the purpose
of our system is very different from anti-spam tech-
niques. We want to ensure that no malicious email
is sent illegitimately on behalf of a user, and current
anti-spam techniques were not designed to deal with
such attacks.
Analysis of the features. Previous research
showed that it is possible to identify the author of an
email just by looking at stylometric features (what
we refer to as writing habits in this paper) [6]. How-
ever, Forsyth et al. showed that such approaches are
only reliable in the presence of a consistent amount of
text [10]. In particular, they identified the minimal
amount of text required for stylometry-based author
identification to become reliable (which is about 250
words). Unfortunately, 78% of the emails in D1 are
under this size limit. In particular, 50% of the emails
in that set are shorter than 100 words.
As we said, to deal with this issue of short email
length, we use two other classes of features: compo-
sition habits and interaction habits. We wanted to
investigate the contribution of these features in de-
tection accuracy, and confirm that writing-habit fea-
tures alone are not sufficient. To achieve this, we
performed the 10-fold cross validation that we ran to
evaluate the classifier again, but this time we only
used writing-habit features. The results show that
writing-habit features alone are indeed failing to ob-
tain an accurate detection. For a user with a 1,000
sent emails history, the average number of false posi-
tives is now 22% – almost three times higher than for
the full-fledged classifier. The lowest rate of false pos-
itives obtained in this case is for users having sent at
least 8,000 emails, yet the FP-rate is still around 9.8%
– almost six times higher than the rate obtained with
the full-fledged classifier. Clearly, while stylometry-
based methods might be useful in forensic cases, they
are not sufficient in this case to determine, with high
confidence, whether an email has been sent by an at-
tacker or not.
5.3 Detecting Attack Emails
We now evaluate IdentityMailer on the attack
datasets S1, S2, and S3. First, we created the email-
sending behavioral profiles for each user U in D1, as
explained in Section 3.2. Then, for each email in S1,
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Figure 4: Analysis of the True Positive rate for our
attack datasets. On the X axis we have the number
of emails that a user sent in the past. As we can see,
IdentityMailer is able to block more and more
emails as malicious as the sending history of a user
increases.
S2, and S3, and each user U , we edited the From:
field in the email to look like it was sent by U , and
ran IdentityMailer against it, to see whether the
email would have been flagged as anomalous if it was
being sent from U ’s account. Since IdentityMailer
does not use, at least at this stage, some header fields
such as the X-Mailer or sender IP address, no addi-
tional editing was required for our test purposes.
Figure 4 shows the detection results of Identity-
Mailer on the three datasets. As for the valida-
tion of the classifier, the performance of Identity-
Mailer depends on how many emails each user has
sent in the past, as well as the consistency of a user’s
behavior while sending emails. In general, an email
history of 200 messages is enough to reach a true
positive rate of 80%, while sent email logs of 1,000
emails or more lead to 90% detection rate. As a
peak, IdentityMailer reaches 98% true positives
for certain users. These detection numbers are actu-
ally very promising and demonstrate very good per-
formance of the system. To put things into perspec-
tive, for the very same evaluation datasets S1, S2,
and S3, most state-of-the-art systems would entirely
fail to detect any of these emails as malicious. Hence,
being able to detect most of these particularly in-
sidious spearphishing emails is undoubtedly a major
improvement over existing systems. In fact, Identi-
tyMailer can be seen as an additional protection
layer that complements existing anti-spam systems,
in order to block advanced spearphishing emails that
other email protection layers would not be able to
detect.
5.4 Fighting an Adapting Enemy
As we said previously, the techniques used in Identi-
tyMailer for building the email-sending behavioral
profiles enable us to extract those characteristics that
identify a certain user’s sending behavior best, hence
performing accurate classification and obtaining bet-
ter detection. Of course, an attacker could imitate
a user’s sending behavior, as an attempt to evade
detection by our system. An attacker who compro-
mised a user’s machine or email account typically has
access to the emails sent by that user in the past (for
example, through the Sent folder of the user’s mailer
program). He can thus leverage these emails to learn
what are the most common characteristics in a users’
email-sending behavior, and replicate them in his ma-
licious emails. However, since the attacker does not
have access to all emails sent by all other users in the
organization, it is difficult for him to know whether
those characteristics, although common in the user’s
behavior, distinguish the user well from the others.
In fact, the most common characteristics of a user’s
behavior might be shared with many other users, thus
by replicating them an attacker would not obtain any
effect on the success of his attack. Even worse, he
might focus on characteristics that have a marginal
importance or very low relevance in the behavioral
profile built by IdentityMailer, and make other
characteristics stand out, in fact making detection
easier.
To investigate what would be the effects of an at-
tacker actively trying to evade our system, we devel-
oped a number of evasion techniques, and tested them
on the spearphishing dataset S3. In particular, for
each user U , and every email M in S3, we extracted
the feature vector Vm, and modified a number of pa-
rameters, to make the email look more similar to the
ones typically sent by U . We then applied the same
detection approach described in Section 5.3 to this
modified dataset. In the following, we describe the
different evasion schemes that we developed.
Coworkers. This is the simplest evasion scheme.
Instead of sending attack emails to email addresses
outside the user’s organization, the attacker sends an
email to another user within the same company, with
whom the victim exchanged at least one email in the
past. The destination address is picked at random.
High activity time period. In this evasion scheme,
the attacker sends emails on the day and hour during
which the user has sent the highest number of emails
in the past.
Top contact. This technique is similar to the
coworkers one, except that the destination address
is chosen as the one to which the user sent the high-
est number of emails.
Mimic. In this technique, the attacker tries to repli-
cate the writing style of the victim. In particular, he
learns the n most common functional and context-
specific words used by the user, and he uses them
in the attack emails with the same ratio as typically
used by the victim in her legitimate emails. We ex-
perimented two different evasion techniques of this
kind, replicating the 10 and 20 most common words
used by a user, respectively.
We tested these evasion techniques described here
above individually, as well as in conjunction with each
other. Table 3 provides a summary of the results
for every (combination of) evasion techniques, com-
pared with the results obtained with the unmodified
dataset. In each evasion scenario, the failure, suc-
cess, and no effect columns indicate the number of
victim users for which the evasion attack has failed,
was successful, or did not change, respectively. The
average change field indicates the average percentage
of emails that successfully evaded IdentityMailer
for that strategy, compared to the detection on the
unmodified dataset. A negative value indicates that,
on average, IdentityMailer performed better on
the modified dataset than on the original one.
As it can be seen, none of the evasion techniques
guarantees that the attack emails will be more suc-
cessful in evading IdentityMailer. All evasion
techniques (except for the coworkers and top contact
ones) provide, on average, an increase in the num-
ber of emails that are not detected as malicious by
Type of Evasion Failure Success No Effect Avg. Change
C 5 0 143 -0.3%
T 81 63 4 +3.4%
T + C 6 0 142 -0.3%
M 10 87 49 12 +2.4%
M 20 91 50 7 +5.0%
T + TC 81 63 4 +3.4%
T + TC + M 10 73 73 2 +5.7%
T + TC + M 20 65 78 5 +8.4%
Table 3: Summary of the results for different evasion strategies: Coworkers (C), Time (T), Top contact
(TC), Mimic 10 words (M 10), Mimic 20 words (M 20), and combinations of them. This table shows that
evading IdentityMailer’s detection is hard: even in the most successful case of evasion, the attack fails
for 43% of the users.
our approach. However, even in the most success-
ful case, in which we use the time, top contact, and
mimic 20 techniques in conjunction, the evasion fails
for 43% of the users, allowing IdentityMailer to
detect more emails as malicious than for the unmod-
ified dataset. If we look at the entire user popula-
tion, this advanced evasion scheme would have en-
abled an additional 8.4% of emails to evade detec-
tion; this means that, for a user who sent 1,000 emails
in the past, IdentityMailer would have still been
able to block 82% spearphishing emails on average.
Given these results, we can conclude that it is not
straightforward for an attacker to evade detection
by IdentityMailer, and that our system is quite
resilient against this type of evasion technique even
when the attacker tries to mimic the victim’s email
sending habits.
An attacker might try a replay attack, by taking
an email that was written by a user in the past, and
sending it again. This strategy has the limitation
that the attack is limited to the content that the user
has already written in the past. We acknowledge that
in some cases this strategy might be viable. However,
this more extreme case of mimicry attack would be
straightforward to mitigate, as we can easily trigger
an identity verification process any time an email re-
sults in a feature vector that is identical to another
one observed in the past.
Another technique that an attacker could try is
imitating the email-sending behavior learning phase
of our system. To this end, he might leverage the
emails that other users sent to the victim in the past
as Mo. The attacker can find these emails, for ex-
ample, in the Inbox of the victim’s mailer program.
In principle, this technique could help in making the
attack more successful, and evade IdentityMailer.
However, the information that an attacker can learn
from the emails received by a user in the past is lim-
ited. For example, it does not give any information
on what the social networks of the other users in the
company look like, and it only shows the behavior
that third party showed when interacting with that
specific user. An attacker might get additional knowl-
edge of the company’s emails by compromising ad-
ditional email accounts. If he obtained access to a
significant number of accounts, he might be able to
replicate the learning process of IdentityMailer
and evade our system. However, an attack of such
breadth is hard to set up, and once an attacker gets
such a pervasive presence is the company’s network,
there is not much that our approach (or possibly any
other) can do.
6 Discussion and limitations
Our results show that IdentityMailer is success-
ful in detecting and blocking attack emails that ap-
pear to have been written by a legitimate user, but
have actually been authored by an attacker abusing
someone else’s account. Like most detection systems,
however, IdentityMailer has some limitations.The
main limitation is that, to be effective, Identity-
Mailer requires an email history of at least 1,000
emails. This makes it difficult to protect, for exam-
ple, the new hires of a company. We argue that email
is such a pervasive communication medium that it
should not take long to obtain a sufficient number
of emails even for a new employee. In addition, a
new hire is probably not going to be a good target
for an attacker, either due to a lack of visibility or
because an attacker would prefer to target more in-
fluential people in the company. These individuals,
however, will have a long email-sending history, and
IdentityMailer will thus protect them effectively.
Another possible limitation in a corporate setting is
that high-ranked executives might delegate their as-
sistants to write some emails on their behalf. This
practice might generate false positives, because Iden-
tityMailer would detect that those emails were not
written by the owner of the account. A possible mit-
igation here is to learn multiple email-sending behav-
iors corresponding to a limited set of individuals who
are using the same account, and thus avoid generat-
ing an alert if the email appears to be authored by
any of those users.
Another limitation of IdentityMailer is that
writing-habit features are specific to the English lan-
guage. If our approach had to protect the employ-
ees of a company whose main language is different
than English, we would have to develop another set of
language-specific features. Previous research showed
that this is feasible even for Asian languages, which
have very different characteristics than English [47].
In Section 5.4 we showed that it is difficult for
attackers to successfully evade our system. How-
ever, attackers could exploit weak points in Identi-
tyMailer’s deployment at specific companies. For
example, if an organization used a publicly-available
set of emails as Mux, an attacker might get access
to that dataset, use it in a similar way to learn the
models and thus evade our system. However, the at-
tacker would still not have access to the emails used
by all the other employees of the company, and the
knowledge of the attacker would still be incomplete.
Similarly, an attacker might try to build emails that
resemble the victim’s style, for example by using a
Context Free Grammar (CFG). I the model used by
the attacker is not complete, however, he will still not
be guaranteed to succeed.
Another problem that we have to consider is the
privacy of users. The email sending behavior is built
not only by leveraging a user’s personal emails, but
also by leveraging the ones sent by her coworkers.
However, feature vectors built from the email are kept
among the client and the server, and are never seen
by the users. Also, the server has to only keep the fea-
ture vector relative to an email, instead of the email
itself. Therefore, we argue that the privacy impli-
cations caused by IdentityMailer are still accept-
able.
Another concern is that some domains, such as
large webmail providers, have a very diverse set of
users, and thus it might be challenging to accurately
model their behavior. We argue that the focus of
IdentityMailer is on corporate users, and we as-
sume that their behavior is more consistent than the
one of general-purpose email providers. In addition,
large webmails have access to additional signals that
are not included in our threat model (such as login
patterns and IP addresses), which can also be lever-
aged to build a behavioral profile.
7 Related Work
Our approach protects the identity of users against
attackers sending emails on their behalf. To this end,
we borrow some ideas from anti-spam techniques, as
well as from the field of forged text detection and
authorship identification. In the following, we discuss
how our approach is related to previous work, and
elaborate on the novelty of our method.
Spam Filtering: Existing work on spam filtering
can be distinguished in two main categories: origin-
analysis and content-analysis techniques. Origin-
analysis techniques try to determine whether emails
are good or bad by looking at their origin. Exam-
ples of characteristics that are indicative of a mali-
cious emails can be the IP address or autonomous
system that the email is sent from, or the geo-
graphical distance between the sender and the re-
cipient [12, 26, 34, 42]. Other origin-based techniques
include Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [43] and Do-
mainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [19]. These tech-
niques try to determine whether an email is actually
coming from the address it claims to come from, by
looking at the sender IP, or at a signature in the
email headers. Origin-based techniques are widely
deployed, because they allow servers to discard spam
emails as soon as the malicious end connects to the
mail server, saving resources and time. In addition,
they reach good coverage, because most spam is sent
by hosts that are part of a botnet, and therefore
have a low reputation [35]. However, in the scenario
in which IdentityMailer works, origin-based tech-
niques are useless, because the only thing they can do
is confirming that an email has been sent by a certain
account, regardless if it is a compromised one or not.
Content-analysis techniques look at the words in
the message itself to determine if it is spam or
not. Proposed methods include Na¨ıve Bayes, Sup-
port Vector Machines, or other machine learning al-
gorithms [7, 22, 28, 29]. Other systems detect spam
by looking at malicious URLs in the email [15, 45].
Content-analysis techniques work well in detecting
spam, however are too computationally intensive to
be applied to every email that a busy mail server re-
ceives [36]. In IdentityMailer, we solve this prob-
lem by analyzing emails as they get sent. We claim
that this analysis is feasible, because the amount of
emails that a mail server sends is lower than the
amount of emails that it receives. Another problem
of traditional content-analysis techniques is that they
look for words that are indicative of spam. In the
presence of a targeted attack, there might be no such
words, since an attack email will use a language that
is similar to the one used in everyday business emails.
This is why in IdentityMailer we learn the typical
sending behavior of a user and match it against the
emails she sends.
A number of systems have been proposed to
counter specific types of spam, such as phishing. Such
systems either look at features in the attack emails
that are indicative of phishing content [9], or at char-
acteristics of the web page that the links in the email
point to [46]. IdentityMailer is more general,
since it can detect any type of attack emails that is
sent by compromised accounts. In addition, existing
phishing techniques fail in detecting those emails that
rely on advanced social engineering tactics, instead of
redirecting the user to a phony login page.
Another category of spam detection techniques
looks at the way in which spammers use the TCP
or SMTP protocol [16, 33]. These techniques work
well in practice against most spam, but are focused
on detecting hosts that belong to a botnet, and are
therefore useless in detecting the type of attacks that
IdentityMailer is designed to prevent.
Email Forgery Detection: A large corpus of re-
search has been performed on determining the au-
thorship of written text. These techniques typically
leverage stylometry and machine learning and re-
turn the most probable author among a set of can-
didates [2, 5, 6, 11, 13]. From our point of view, these
approaches suffer from two major problems: the first
one is that they typically need a set of possible au-
thors, which in our case we do not have. The second
problem is that email bodies are often times too short
to reliably determine the author by just looking at
stylometry [10]. Lin et al. proposed a system that
looks at the writing style of an email, and is able to
tell whether that email was written by an author or
not [20]. This approach may solve the first problem,
but does not solve the second one, in which we have
emails that are too short to make a meaningful deci-
sion. To mitigate this problem, in IdentityMailer
we leverage many other features other than stylome-
try, such as the times at which a user sends emails,
or her social network.
Khonji et al. presented ASCAI [17], a system that
detects if an email author has likely been forged. AS-
CAI looks at the most common n-grams in a user’s
emails, and flag as anomalous emails that contain
words that the user rarely uses. Unlike Identi-
tyMailer, ASCAI looks for any word, instead of
focusing on writeprint features (such as functional
words). For this reason, this system would fail in de-
tecting spearphishing emails whose content is about
the same topics that the user typically discusses, but
that have been authored by a different person. Iden-
tityMailer, on the other hand, has been designed
to detect this type of stealthy spearphishing emails,
and is therefore effective in blocking them.
Stolfo et al. presented the Email Mining Toolkit
(EMT) [31, 32]. This tool mines email logs to find
communities of users who frequently interact with
each other. After learning the communities, the sys-
tem flags as anomalous emails that are addressed to
people outside them. Although EMT leverages an
idea similar to IdentityMailer’s interaction fea-
tures, it is tailored at detecting large-scale threats,
such as worms spreading through email. The fact
that IdentityMailer leverages other types of fea-
tures allow our system to detect more subtle, one-of-
a-kind attack emails.
Egele et al. proposed a system that learns the
behavior of users on Online Social Networks (OSN)
and flags anomalous messages as possible compro-
mises [8]. Because of the high number of false pos-
itives, their system can only detect large-scale cam-
paigns, by aggregating similar anomalous messages.
As we have shown, IdentityMailer is able to de-
tect attacks that are composed of a single email, and
which have not been seen before.
8 Conclusions
We presented IdentityMailer, a system that pro-
tects the mailbox of corporate users by checking
whether an email has been written by the legiti-
mate owner of an email account. This work is the
first step towards the protection of individuals and
companies against advanced email attacks, such as
spearphishing. IdentityMailer is able to learn the
typical sending behavior of the account’s owner and
can subsequently check all emails sent from the ac-
count against this profile in order to block advanced
spearphishing attacks sent from a compromised email
account. By performing experiments on real world
datasets, we also showed that IdentityMailer can
effectively block attacks that state-of-the-art protec-
tion systems are unable to detect, and that an at-
tacker has no clear strategy to make his emails look
legitimate in order to evade our detection system.
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